An overview of the history and politics of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in Africa
This article provides an overview of the history and politics of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament in Africa. It explores the process that led to the establishment of an African nuclear-weapon-free zone, and discusses the terms of its founding document, the Pelindaba Treaty. It also discusses the role of African states in recent and on-going disarmament processes such as the review cycle of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Humanitarian Initiative. The article concludes with a discussion of the future of African states’ engagement in the movement towards a world free of nuclear weapons.
- 1 1 Introduction
- 2 2 Background
- 3 3 Case studies
- 4 4 The role of the region in global disarmament efforts
- 4.1 4.1 The African Union (AU)
- 4.2 4.2 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
- 4.3 4.3 The New Agenda Coalition (NAC)
- 4.4 4.4 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
- 4.5 4.5 The UN General Assembly First Committee
- 4.6 4.6 The Conference on Disarmament (CD)
- 4.7 4.7 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
- 4.8 4.8 UNSC Resolution 1540
- 4.9 4.9 The Nuclear Security Summit
- 4.10 4.10 The Humanitarian Initiative
- 5 5 Conclusion
Africa became a nuclear-weapon-free zone when the Treaty of Pelindaba entered into force in July 2009. The Treaty was a result of a protracted process. The first calls for the establishment of a zone date back to the early 1960s, when French nuclear tests in the Sahara provoked strong anti-nuclear sentiments. Today there are no states in Africa with nuclear weapons. South Africa did, however, develop nuclear weapons, but voluntarily dismantled its weapons and discontinued its nuclear programme during the last years of the Apartheid regime. A number of other African states are believed to have initiated nuclear-weapons programmes without producing nuclear weapons before they were discontinued.
As a bloc representing 54 UN member states and over a billion people, African states play an important role in nuclear disarmament processes. There is, however, considerable variation in individual African states’ level of engagement in these processes.
This article is divided into five parts: Following this introduction, it discusses the establishment of an African NWFZ and the terms of the Pelindaba Treaty. Next, it discusses the nuclear policies of a selection of African states (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria, and South Africa). Before concluding, the article identifies the most important diplomatic networks and organisations in which African states are engaged, and discusses the role of African states in on-going non-proliferation and disarmament efforts.
The establishment of the African nuclear-weapon-free zone was a lengthy process. The first calls for a zone date back to the early 1960s, when French nuclear tests in the Sahara (both atmospheric and underground) brought nuclear disarmament high on the agenda of several African states.[i] The nuclear tests resulted in significant radioactive fallout in several African countries, endangering both humans, animals, and the environment.[ii] As a response to these tests, a nuclear-weapon-free zone was proposed by 14 African states through UN General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI) in 1961. The Resolution also called on member states to ‘refrain from carrying out or continuing to carry out in Africa nuclear tests in any form.’[iii] In 1964, the Summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU, predecessor to the African Union) issued a Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, which was endorsed by the UN General Assembly in Resolution 2033 (XX).[iv]
In 1990, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution calling for the implementation of the 1964 Declaration and the convening of a meeting of experts ‘for the preparation and implementation of a convention or treaty on the denuclearization of Africa.’[v] The OAU and the UN established a joint group of experts ‘to examine the modalities and elements for the preparation and implementation of a convention or treaty on the denuclearisation of Africa’,[vi] which met for the first time in May 1991 in Addis Ababa. The participating experts came from Algeria, Nigeria, Tanzania, Zaire,[vii] and Zimbabwe, as well as three representatives from the OAU, one from the UN, as well as observers from the Treaty of Tlatelolco[viii] and the Treaty of Rarotonga,[ix] and representatives from the Secretariat of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).[x]
The OAU was given a central role in the negotiations that followed, since the group of experts believed that the Charter of the OAU should be the basic reference instrument for any treaty, and that the OAU should be its depositary. The inclusion of representatives of the UN was considered crucial to ensure that the agreement would be consistent with the purposes and principles of the UN. Representatives of the IAEA were included so as to ensure access to top technical expertise.[xi]
In June 1992, the OAU established an intergovernmental group of experts consisting of Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Togo, Zaire, and Zimbabwe to consider a report with recommendations from the OAU/UN joint group of experts. This report was also reviewed by the UN General Assembly, which adopted a resolution to change the mandate of the OAU/UN group of experts to draft a treaty or convention on the denuclearization of Africa.[xii] The OAU/UN group of experts met several times in various African states the following years until the final treaty text was completed at a meeting in Pelindaba, South Africa,[xiii] in June 1995.[xiv]
The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, commonly known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, was opened for signature on 11 April 1996 in Cairo, and entered into force on 15 July 2009
The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty, commonly known as the Treaty of Pelindaba, was opened for signature on 11 April 1996 in Cairo, and entered into force on 15 July 2009, when Burundi became the 28th African State to deposit its instrument of ratification.
Relatively few countries ratified the Treaty within the first couple of years—Algeria, Burkina Faso, the Gambia, Mauritania, Mauritius, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe being the exceptions. Most states delayed the ratification for years, postponing the Treaty’s entry-into-force significantly. Even though the Treaty has now entered into force, it is noteworthy that it is still 15 ratifications short of achieving full coverage of the African continent and its islands.[xv] However, lack of ratification does not necessarily mean that there is a lack of political will in terms of adhering to the spirit of th treaty. Possible reasons for non-ratification or delayed ratification include lack of capacity and/or prioritisation of other issues. Of the 15 non-parties, all but two (Morocco and South Sudan) are signatories to the Treaty, and therefore ‘obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of [the] treaty’.[xvi]
2.1 Terms of the Treaty
The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaty aims to ensure that nuclear weapons are never developed, produced, stockpiled, tested, acquired, or stationed in Africa, including its island states. There is no explicit prohibition against the use of nuclear weapons in the Treaty, but given the comprehensive prohibition against possession, one might say that use is banned by implication (one cannot use something one cannot possess). The Treaty also contains provisions for the dismantlement of any existing nuclear-weapons-related facilities. The Pelindaba Treaty also prohibits research on nuclear weapons, dumping of radioactive waste, and armed attacks on nuclear installations. The Treaty supports the use of nuclear energy and technology for peaceful purposes.
The Treaty of Pelindaba includes three additional protocols. While Protocols I and II apply to the five states recognised by the NPT as ‘nuclear-weapon states’ (NWSs),[xvii] Protocol III applies to France and Spain as states with overseas territories within the zone. Protocol I invites all NWSs to accord the states in the region ‘negative security assurances’, that is to pledge not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any party to the Treaty or ‘any territory within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone for which a State that has become a Party to Protocol III is internationally responsible’.[xviii] In addition, it invites the NWSs to agree ‘not to contribute to any act that constitutes a violation of the Treaty or of this Protocol’.[xix] This is also included in Protocols II and III.[xx] Protocol I has been signed by all the NWS and ratified by China, France, the Russian Federation, and the United Kingdom (i.e. all of the NWSs but the United States).
Protocol II urges the NWSs to agree ‘not to test or assist or encourage the testing of any nuclear explosive device anywhere within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone’.[xxi] Protocol I and Protocol II has been signed by all the NWSs, and ratified by all the NWSs but the United States. US President Barack Obama submitted Protocols I and II to the US Senate for ratification in May 2011.[xxii] The Protocols are still pending the Senate’s approval.[xxiii]
Protocol III invites each party (France and Spain), to respect the provisions of the Treaty in ‘the territories for which it is de jure or de facto internationally responsible situated within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone’,[xxiv] France has signed and ratified it. Spain, which is a non-nuclear-weapon state, has neither signed nor ratified Protocol III of the Treaty. Spain claims that three of its territories—the Canary Islands and two coastal enclaves in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla—are an integral part of the European Union and should therefore not be included in the African nuclear-weapon-free zone. Additionally, Spain argues that the Treaty of Pelindaba does not contain any global non-proliferation or disarmament provisions that it has not already signed.[xxv]
Since the Treaty of Pelindaba entered into force in July 2009, the African Union (AU) has convened three conferences on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty. The First Conference of States took place in Cairo in November 2010 and the most recent was held in Addis Ababa in 2014. The conferences are held every two years and the fourth conference is expected to take place during 2016. The African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), the Treaty’s implementing body, has met six times in Addis Ababa since 2011. The 12 commissioners of AFCONE are elected for three-year terms. The elected members for the period 2015–2018 are, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Mali, Mauritius, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe.[xxvi] The Treaty of Pelindaba is quite similar to other nuclear-weapon-free zone treaties, such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the Treaty of Rarotonga, but goes further because it contains special provisions for the dismantling of existing nuclear-weapon-related facilities.[xxvii]
2.2 Nuclear technology and material on the African continent
According to the IAEA, Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Libya, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa currently have operational nuclear research reactors. In addition, South Africa has two nuclear power reactors.[xxviii] Since the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD)[xxix] recognized nuclear material as a source of energy for Africa, a number of African countries have begun investigating the feasibility of developing nuclear power plants for electricity generation:[xxx] Kenya, Namibia, Sudan, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Uganda. Some West African countries have also met regarding the creation of an integrated West African regional nuclear power programme. These countries were Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, and Senegal, collectively the West African Integrated Nuclear Power Group (WAINPG).[xxxi] The IAEA has provided research assistance to some of these.[xxxii]
Many African countries have uranium ore deposits, which is a key ingredient in the production of most nuclear weapons.[xxxiii] Namibia was the world’s fourth largest producer of mined uranium in 2009 and is, together with South Africa and Niger, amongst the main suppliers of uranium to international markets.[xxxiv]
3 Case studies
The following section seeks to highlight the role of some of the key states in the African region on matters of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.
The first French nuclear weapons tests were conducted in Algeria between 1960 and 1966, both in the atmosphere and underground. In the early 1980s, Algeria launched its nuclear programme, and established the Commissariat for New Energy to develop nuclear energy. It was speculated that Algeria may have been developing a nuclear-weapons programme in cooperation with China and Argentina in the 1980s and 1990s, which allegedly was motivated by a desire to counter a perceived threat from Libya. However, the IAEA has found little evidence of a weapons programme. It has, however, been confirmed that Algeria purchased a research reactor from Argentina in 1985 (prior to Argentina’s accession to the NPT in 1995), and that China has been Algeria’s main supplier of nuclear technology following the conclusion of a secret agreement between the two countries in 1983.[xxxv]
In 1992, Algeria accepted IAEA safeguards under pressure from the United States. Algeria joined the NPT in 1995, after rejecting it for decades on the grounds that ‘Algeria should not have to renounce a nuclear-weapons program when other nations could continue with theirs’.[xxxvi] There are currently two operational nuclear research reactors in Algeria, both intended for civil nuclear energy purposes. The IAEA has provided research assistance to Algeria for possibly adopting nuclear energy as a means of generating electricity.[xxxvii] Algerian Ambassador Taous Feroukhi acted as president of the Ninth NPT Conference in 2015.
Egypt is not known to have engaged in any significant efforts to develop a nuclear weapons capability. It has been a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1981. Instead of developing nuclear weapons, Egypt has focused on conventional armaments. However, Egypt has refused to ratify the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). A likely reason for Egypt’s reluctance to ratify these conventions is that Israel, Egypt’s neighbour, has not ratified any of the major ‘WMD conventions’ (the BTWC, the CWC, and the NPT).
Egypt has not ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Egypt’s ratification is one of the 44 required ratifications/accessions necessary for the treaty to enter into force as per the Treaty’s Annex 2. Egypt has linked its lack of ratification of the CTBT to Israel’s nuclear posture, and has expressed that it will not ratify the CTBT until Israel joins the NPT.[xxxviii]
According to the IAEA, Egypt is currently one of seven African countries that possess nuclear research reactors.[xxxix] Egypt chaired both the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) during the 2010 NPT Review Conference and played a significant role in the brokering of the Final Document. In addition to being a leading country in the Arab League of States, Egypt is often seen as a bridge-builder between the Arab countries and the rest of Africa. Egypt hosted the conference for signing the African Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Treaty, the Treaty of Pelindaba, in Cairo in 1996.
Since 1974, Egypt has taken the initiative to propose a Middle East nuclear-weapons-free zone. In 1990, Egypt expanded this initiative to encompass not only nuclear weapons, but all weapons of mass destruction, thus including biological and chemical weapons.[xl] Yet, despite promising signs at NPT conferences in 1995, 2000, and 2010, where the NPT parties pledged to work for the creation of such a zone, no agreement has thus far been reached. The NPT review conferences of 2005 and 2015 both failed to agree on a final document, largely due to disagreements over the proposed Middle East NWFZ.[xli] In 2013, Egypt walked out of the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting over certain states’ apparent unwillingness to convening a conference on the creation of a zone.[xlii] This was the first time in the history of the NPT review cycle that a party walked out mid conference.
Libya ratified the NPT in 1975 and five years later it reached an agreement with the IAEA on international inspections of its nuclear installations. Despite this, Libya’s long-time dictator Muammar Gaddafi repeatedly proclaimed in the mid and late 1970s that Libya was determined to acquire nuclear weapons. This desire was presumably motivated by Gaddafi’s conviction that Israel had acquired nuclear weapons. Over the following decades, Libya cooperated with various states on getting the necessary technology and resources to acquire nuclear weapons. In 2002, British intelligence revealed that Libya was involved in the so-called A.Q. Khan Network, a criminal gang involved in supplying nuclear-weapons technology to North Korea—and potentially other states—in the early 2000s.[xliii]
In December 2003, following nine months of secret talks between Libyan, American, and British officials, Libya announced that it would destroy any and all of its biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. Libya also agreed to allow for international inspections of its weapons facilities.[xliv] Following the 2011 Libyan revolution leading to the fall of Gaddafi’s regime in September, it has been claimed that radioactive material was discovered at a military site. What was found was said to be so-called yellowcake, which is processed uranium ore that may be used to produce enriched uranium for nuclear purposes.[xlv] Since the fall of Gaddafi in 2011 not much has been done in Libya on nuclear-weapons policy. The National Transitional Council has, however, announced that they are in close contact with the IAEA and have no interest in keeping the material.[xlvi] According to the IAEA, Libya currently has one research reactor, and the IAEA has provided research assistance to Libya regarding the adoption of nuclear energy as a means of generating electricity.[xlvii]
Nigeria has been actively engaged in nuclear disarmament processes since the establishment of the multilateral nuclear disarmament regime in the 1960s. Nigeria was one of three African states involved in the work of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament,[xlviii] the body that negotiated the NPT. Nigeria was also heavily involved in the process to make Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone.[xlix] Nigeria has played an important role at several NPT review conferences, delivering statements both in its national capacity and on behalf of groups such as the Group of 77 and the African Group. Nigeria continues to play a leadership role within the African Group in the NPT, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and the UN General Assembly First Committee. Nigeria is also an active member of the NAM and the De-Alerting Group. Since 2007, the De-Alerting Group has called for ‘action to address the significant numbers of nuclear weapons that remain today at high levels of readiness’.[l] Nigeria is one of several African states in the process of investigating the feasibility of developing nuclear power plants for generation of electricity, and the IAEA has provided research assistance to Nigeria on this matter.[li]
3.5 South Africa
South Africa is the only known country in the world to have given up an indigenously developed nuclear-weapons capability.[lii] In March 1993, President F.W. de Klerk announced that South Africa had a nuclear-weapons programme dating back to 1974, when research on peaceful nuclear explosions initiated in 1969 had been expanded to a weapons programme.[liii] By the time President de Klerk ordered a halt of the nuclear-weapons programme in 1989, South Africa had a stockpile of six nuclear weapons, and one more was under construction.
South Africa acceded to the NPT in 1991 and signed a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA the same year. South Africa was under no obligation to reveal past nuclear-weapons activities when acceding to the NPT, but it nonetheless declared that they had possessed nuclear weapons. Following de Klerk’s announcement in 1993, IAEA experts were sent to South Africa to verify that the weapons had been destroyed. In 1994, the group of experts concluded that South Africa’s nuclear weapons had indeed been dismantled.[liv]
According to the IAEA, South Africa currently has nuclear research reactors and two nuclear power reactors, the latter intended for nuclear energy purposes. Another eight nuclear reactors have also been suggested.[lv] South Africa is the only African state at present with nuclear power reactors.[lvi]
South Africa has claimed that its nuclear-weapons programme had a purely deterrent value. Given the clandestine nature of the South African nuclear-weapons programme, however, it is hard to argue that it had any deterrent effect at all (after all, deterrence can only work if the existence and credibility of the deterrent is known). The question of why South Africa chose to destroy its nuclear weapons and end its nuclear-weapons programme has been much discussed. Unfortunately, much information about South Africa’s nuclear-weapons programme remains unknown as a result of classification and lost records.[lvii] It has been argued that one reason for ending the programme may have been the high economic costs in a time of economic difficulty during the last years of apartheid. Another possible explanation is that de Klerk was reluctant to give the ‘black’ African National Congress (ANC)—which would inevitably gain power—access to nuclear the weapons.[lviii]
After years of negotiations and lobbying in which South Africa played a key role, South Africa and 22 other states became members of the CD in 1996.[lix] South Africa is also a member of both the NAM and the NAC. As a member of a nuclear-weapon-free zone and being the only country in the world to have voluntarily dismantled its nuclear-weapons capability, South Africa is endowed with ‘moral capital’ that gives it influence in multilateral forums and processes concerned with nuclear disarmament.
4 The role of the region in global disarmament efforts
African states are represented through multiple groupings related to the issue of nuclear weapons, including the African Union (AU), the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the New Agenda Coalition (NAC).[lx]
4.1 The African Union (AU)
The African Union (AU) was established in 2002 and succeeded the Organisation of African Unity (OAU). The AU consists of 54 countries, Morocco being the only African state that is not a member of the union.[lxi] The OAU, and later the AU, played a significant role in the process of negotiating and promoting ratification of the Treaty of Pelindaba. According to the AU Commissioner for Peace and Security, the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty is part of a wider strategy to implement the Common African Defence and Security Policy, indicating that it is a key component of the overall peace and security architecture of the AU.[lxii] Despite the AU’s work with the Treaty of Pelindaba, the AU has not marked itself internationally as a significant actor in the work to eliminate nuclear weapons. This may be explained by the question of priority: the AU ranks other issues higher on its agenda, problems that have greater impact on the security of the African continent.
4.2 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)
The NAM was established during the Cold War as an alternative to alignment with one of the two Cold War blocs (East and West), but has continued to be a significant force after the end of the Cold War. The NAM represents 2/3 of UN members and 55 per cent of the world’s population. Given the size of NAM, it has the potential to play a significant role in international negotiations if the members act concertedly. The NAM did not play a role during the first few review cycles of the NPT. Most of the members of the NAM acted through the Group of 77 developing states (G77). Since the late 1980s, however, the NAM has taken over the role of the G77 in nuclear-weapons-related forums. All African states except for South Sudan are members of the NAM. The NAM gives regular statements at the UNGA First Committee, and played a significant role at the 2010 and 2015 NPT Review Conferences, with Egypt chairing the NAM in 2010.[lxiii] In recent years, the NAM has consistently underlined the necessity to start negotiations within the Conference on Disarmament ‘on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons with a specified timeframe.’[lxiv]
4.3 The New Agenda Coalition (NAC)
The New Agenda Coalition (NAC) is composed of six ‘middle powers’ from across the globe, established with an aim of creating a nuclear-weapon-free world. Two African states—Egypt and South Africa—are members of the NAC. .[lxv] The NAC was established in 1998 as a consequence of the lack of progress on the international nuclear disarmament agenda following the NPT’s indefinite extension in 1995. The NAC played a key role in brokering the consensus outcomes at the 2000 and 2010 NPT review conferences. Since its establishment, the NAC has consistently submitted resolutions calling for a world free of nuclear weapons to the UNGA First Committee.
4.4 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)
All African states but South Sudan are parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the most important instrument of the nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime.[lxvi] Although most African states have attended the five-yearly NPT Review Conferences (RevCons), the proportion of African states attending the preparatory committee meetings has been significantly lower. And although a a handful of African countries have played leading roles in the development of the regime—in particular Egypt, Nigeria, South Africa, and Zimbabwe—the involvement of most African states has been limited.[lxvii] The relatively modest level of engagement by certain African states can to a large extent be attributed to lack of resources and capacity.[lxviii]
South Africa played a crucial role in securing the indefinite extension of the NPT at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995.[lxix] As provided by its Article X, the NPT would only be automatically effective for 25 years after entering into force, after which a conference should be held to decide whether to extend the NPT indefinitely or for another fixed period or periods. The NWSs and their allies wanted to extend the Treaty indefinitely without any conditions. Certain neutral and non-aligned states, however, wanted to extend the Treaty for shorter fixed periods and with strict conditions. South Africa, which had discontinued its weapons programme and joined the NPT just a few years earlier, played a key role in brokering a compromise deal through which the NPT was extended indefinitely in exchange for a ‘package’ of commitments, sometimes described as a ‘second grand bargain’ (the NPT itself being the ‘first’). The package included a set of commitments on disarmament, a strengthening of the review process, and a commitment to create a zone free of WMD in the Middle East. At the time, many saw the indefinite extension as a victory for the cause of nuclear disarmament. In hindsight, however, many would argue that the indefinite extension stripped the non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWSs) of any leverage over the NWSs in disarmament negotiations.[lxx]
At the 2000 Review Conference, Egypt and South Africa played critical roles through their membership in the NAC. The adoption of a substantive Final Document by consensus, containing ‘13 steps for disarmament’, is widely credited to the influence of the NAC. The Final Document affirmed the commitment of the NWSs to ‘accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States parties are committed under article VI.’[lxxi] This was seen as a great victory for the NNWSs. Yet after just a few years, France and the United States explicitly distanced themselves from the 13 steps.[lxxii] The commitments assumed in 1995 and 2000 have still not been implemented.
At the 2005 RevCon, the leading roles were played by Egypt and the United States. The Conference was dominated by squabbles over procedural matters, proxying for deep differences over substantive issues. The charge that the NWSs had failed to come good on their promises was headed by Egypt.[lxxiii] Egypt’s stance was described as both ‘uncompromising’ and ‘principled’.[lxxiv] The Conference ended without agreement.
Five years later, the NAC, which had reportedly been riven by internal differences in 2005,[lxxv] was back to playing a constructive role. Two issues were particularly important in achieving consensus on a Final Declaration: progress on nuclear disarmament, and the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East.[lxxvi] Following weeks of negotiations, the RevCon agreed to convene a Conference on a Middle Eastern zone free of weapons of mass destruction in 2012.[lxxvii] However, the conference has been postponed indefinitely.
As a leading country in the Arab League, as well as being the chair of both the NAM and the NAC at the time, Egypt played a particularly important role during the 2010 RevCon. A number of NNWSs, including many in Africa, expressed support for a civil society proposal of a Nuclear Weapons Convention that would declare the possession, stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons illegal.[lxxviii] Encouraged by the UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon’s five-point action plan on disarmament, many NNWSs wanted the RevCon to endorse the goal of negotiating a convention.[lxxix] In an early draft text in Subsidiary Body 1, Egypt proposed, on behalf of the NAM, that the UN Secretary General would convene a global conference in 2014 ‘to achieve agreement on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified time-frame with the deadline of the year 2025, including in particular a treaty to eliminate nuclear weapons (Nuclear Weapons Convention)’.[lxxx] The United States, France, and Russia resisted these proposals and other attempts to negotiate a legally binding or specified timeframes for disarmament.[lxxxi] The RevCon produced a Final Document containing 64 ‘actions’, but many of these have not been implemented. Several African countries made concluding remarks after the Final Document was adopted, including Algeria, Egypt (on behalf of the NAM), Libya, Nigeria, South Africa, Sudan, and Tanzania. All African countries that made statements aligned themselves with the statement made by the NAM that promised to maintain pressure on the NWSs to realize ‘the full and prompt implementation of nuclear disarmament commitments by Nuclear-Weapon States, aiming at the total elimination of nuclear weapons by 2025’.[lxxxii] African representatives remarked that although they were disappointed that the RevCon did not produce a stronger outcome, the final document should be considered as progress.[lxxxiii]
The 2015 RevCon did not produce agreement. The majority of NNWSs and the NWSs and their allies were deeply divided over the issues of disarmament and the convening of a conference on a WMD-free zone in the Middle East. Out of the African countries, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, and South Africa were particularly active in the discussions.
4.5 The UN General Assembly First Committee
The UN General Assembly First Committee on Disarmament and International Security is one of six main committees at the UN General Assembly, responsible for disarmament and related international security questions. The First Committee meets for 4–5 weeks in October every year, and all UN member states may attend the sessions. The First Committee allows states to discuss policy in a relatively unrestricted manner. Yet while the First Committee offers many opportunities in principle, it often fails to make good use of its potential. The discussions in the First Committee are often seen as largely static in the sense that ‘there is limited acknowledgment of other states’ perspectives, and a lack of flexibility in re-examining one’s own perspective’.[lxxxiv] This has arguably turned the First Committee into a ‘resolution-generating machine’, in which repetitive and largely redundant resolutions are voted on every year, instead of a political forum for debate on disarmament-related issues.[lxxxv] At the First Committee’s thematic debates on nuclear weapons, African states have not been among the most active countries. Still, several African states have made statements during this debate in recent years, both individually and as members of groupings such as NAM, NAC, and the De-Alerting Group.
4.6 The Conference on Disarmament (CD)
The Conference on Disarmament (CD)[lxxxvi] is a multilateral negotiating forum for arms control and disarmament. The CD was created at the UN General Assembly’s Special Session on Disarmament in 1978 and succeeded the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD, 1969–78). The CD has remained deadlocked since 1996. The CD operates by strict consensus rules—for both procedural and substantive matters—which forms part of the reason for the CD’s inability to perform its task of negotiating treaties. With the exception of 1998 and 2009, the CD has not been able to reach consensus on its programme of work since the mid-1990s.[lxxxvii]
12 African states are currently members of the CD
When established in 1978, the CD had 40 members, which was reduced to 38 with the reunification of Germany and the breakup of Yugoslavia. In 1995, the membership was extended by 23 additional states to 61, and finally, in 1999, to 65, which is where it has since remained.[lxxxviii] The extension followed a long process over several years of negotiations and lobbying in which South Africa played a key role. The new member states included Cameroon, Senegal, South Africa, and Zimbabwe from the African continent. The CD now counts 65 members, including all the nine nuclear-armed states. 12 African states are currently members of the CD: Algeria, Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe.[lxxxix] As established by its Rules of Procedure,[xc] the CD invites non-member states to take part in its work as observers on an annual basis. As of 2016, African observer states to the CD included Ghana, Guinea, Libya, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, and Sudan. Observer states may attend and speak at CD meetings as well as circulate papers and make contributions.[xci] Still, over the years, the CD has been criticised for its lack of transparency with regards to its membership. A group of non-member states have aligned themselves in the Informal Group of Observer States (IGOS), which on several occasions has addressed the lack of will for CD membership expansion.[xcii]
4.7 The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT)
The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) bans the testing of nuclear weapons in all environments. The Treaty was negotiated at the CD in Geneva, but, as consensus could not be achieved there, was transferred to the UNGA for adoption. As it has not been ratified by a group of states for which entry into force is necessary, the CTBT has still not become effective. In Africa, three countries (Mauritius, Somalia, and South Sudan) have not yet signed, while ratification is pending from seven countries (Comoros, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, the Gambia, São Tomé and Príncipe, Zimbabwe, and Swaziland). Africa is the region with the largest number of states hosting monitoring facilities. Once complete, there will be 38 monitoring facilities located in 24 African States.[xciii]
Egypt’s ratification of the Treaty is mandatory for the Treaty to enter into force since Egypt is one of the 44 ‘Annex 2’ states that must ratify the Treaty before it enters into force.[xciv] Egypt has linked its lack of ratification of the CTBT to Israel’s nuclear posture. In 2001, Egypt’s Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs Mahmoud Mubarak stated before the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force Of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty that ‘the question of the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) cannot neglect the regional considerations associated with the Middle East. Especially, Israel’s position vis-à-vis the ratification of the Treaty, and [the country’s] stance on nuclear non-proliferation in general’.[xcv] In 2005, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Ahmed Aboul Gheit reportedly stated that Egypt would not ratify the CTBT until Israel Joins the NPT.[xcvi] This stance was reaffirmed in September 2011 in a statement made by Egypt before the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). Egypt stated that the only way to realize a Middle East free of nuclear weapons was to achieve ‘the universality of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, through the adherence to the NPT by the only country in our region that has not yet acceded to it’.[xcvii]
4.8 UNSC Resolution 1540
The UN Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1540 in 2004, obliging states to ‘refrain from supporting by any means non-state actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their delivery systems’.[xcviii] The Resolution’s adoption under Chapter VII of the UN Charter makes it legally binding on all UN member states. The Resolution imposes binding obligations on all states to establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons, and their means of delivery, including establishing appropriate controls over related materials. The 1540 Committee was established to monitor and oversee the implementation of the Resolution. All UN member states have repeatedly been obliged to submit reports on the implementation of the Resolution to the 1540 Committee.[xcix]
There has been deficient reporting by African states in accordance with the requirements in UNSCR 1540. Of the states that have not submitted reports to the 1540 Committee, nearly all are developing countries and out of 17 states, 13 are African countries. Furthermore, the African states that have submitted reports have rarely provided sufficient details, with South Africa being a notable exception.[c] Many African states lack the capacity to meet the demand for an increasing number of reports that need to be submitted to various UN bodies. Deficient reporting does therefore not necessarily imply a lack of implementation of UNSCR 1540 on the African continent.[ci] The African Union was the first international organisation to designate a focal point for the Resolution (doing so in 2011), and has played an increasingly decisive role in the implementation of the Resolution in Africa.[cii] The African Union arranged a conference on the implementation of Resolution 1540 in April 2016.
4.9 The Nuclear Security Summit
The Nuclear Security Summit aims at preventing nuclear terrorism. The summits were held four times with two-year intervals between 2010 and 2016. At the 2016 summit it was announced that that year’s gathering would be the last of its kind.[ciii] In April 2010, 47 world leaders met to discuss measures to prevent nuclear terrorism and secure vulnerable nuclear materials at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC. Only five of the 47 countries invited to the 2010 summit were from Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and South Africa. The participating countries were chosen according to their geographic, economic, and political diversity, as well as their influence on nuclear security in general.[civ] At the 2012 Summit, Gabon became the sixth African country to participate. All six countries were invited to, and participated at, the 2014 and 2016 summits.
The 2010 Nuclear Security Summit agreed on a work plan consisting of voluntary steps for the participating countries to ensure the safe ‘storage, use, transportation and disposal of nuclear materials and in preventing non-state actors from obtaining the information required to use such materials for malicious purposes’.[cv] Progress on the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit work plan and the status of individual country commitments to this work plan have been key issues at the Nuclear Security Summits of 2012, 2014, and 2016. Several studies of the implementation of the 2010 work plan have been made. Few, if any, of these refer to Africa. As one analyst claims, this may signify ‘either that very little is happening on the continent or, more likely, that African states are not seen as major threats to nuclear security’.[cvi] It should be noted that none of the five participating African countries at the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit made national commitments. Despite this, it is noteworthy that South Africa has taken action on securing nuclear materials and has made an important contribution to eliminating civilian highly enriched uranium and consolidating spent fuel.[cvii] However, the lack of engagement by the other participating African countries may indicate that nuclear security is not a high priority on the African continent, as may be explained by African states’ prioritisation of other issues.
4.10 The Humanitarian Initiative
The Humanitarian Initiative is an effort by non-nuclear-weapon states at reframing the international debate on nuclear disarmament. The Initiative grew out of the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which states that any use of nuclear weapons would have ‘catastrophic’ humanitarian consequences. On this basis, the Norwegian government invited all interested states and organisations to a conference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons in Oslo in March 2013. 35 African states were represented at the Oslo conference, and 9 of them delivered statements. At the Oslo Conference, Mexico announced that it would hold a follow-up conference in Nayarit in February the following year, thus ensuring that the ‘Humanitarian Initiative’ became a sort of process or movement rather than a stand-alone conference. 146 states attended the conference in Nayarit, making it significantly more popular than the NPT Preparatory Committee meeting the same year. 45 African states attended, and 16 of them made statements. A third humanitarian-impact conference, again attended by 45 African states (20 made statements), was held in Vienna in December 2014. There, the hosts issued a Pledge to ‘stigmatise, prohibit, and eliminate nuclear weapons’ and joined other states to endorse the pledge. At a meeting of the UN Open-Ended Working Group on Nuclear Disarmament in 2016, Zambia joined a group of eight other states—all parties to a NWFZ treaty—to propose the commencement of negotiations on a treaty banning nuclear weapons in 2017.[cviii]
Most African states have been strong supporters of the Humanitarian Initiative. As of June 2016, 47 of the 54 African states had endorsed the Humanitarian Pledge.
Most African states have been strong supporters of the Humanitarian Initiative. As of June 2016, 47 of the 54 African states had endorsed the Humanitarian Pledge. 53 of them voted in favour of a resolution based on the Pledge submitted to the UNGA session in 2015. The only African state that has neither formally endorsed the Pledge nor voted in favour of the Resolution is South Sudan. South Sudan is not a party to the NPT.[cix]
The road that eventually led to the entry-into-force in 2009 of the Treaty of Pelindaba was a long and winding one, but it has resulted in a legally binding regime that today makes Africa the largest nuclear-weapon-free zone in the world. It is also the only NWFZ that has had to cope with the fact that one of the states in the region at one point possessed nuclear weapons.
While a number of ratifications still remain, and two countries have yet to sign the treaty, the normative effect of the regime already seems to have had a positive effect, both among African states and on the global multilateral arena. Being part of a NWFZ allows states to take a firm stand on the moral high ground in debates on nuclear disarmament, and it has likely also had an impact on the interest and support among African states in this issue more generally.
As stated in the preamble of the Pelindaba Treaty, the African NWFZ was envisaged as a contribution to international non-proliferation and disarmament, and towards the ultimate goal of a world ‘entirely free of nuclear weapons’. The Treaty may have reduced the likelihood that nuclear weapons could be used against an African state, but at the same time, it has become increasingly clear over the past few years that any use of nuclear weapons will have catastrophic humanitarian consequences that will not be bound by space or time. A ‘limited’ exchange of nuclear weapons in another part of the world could therefore have serious effects also for African states.
Multilateral efforts therefore continue, with a view to achieving the universally accepted goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. In this endeavour, African states have and will continue to play a crucial role.
African states have shown through the process of negotiating the Mine Ban Treaty and the Convention on Cluster Munitions that they can play a significant role in international negotiations, especially when several are acting together. Through the process of negotiating the Convention on Cluster Munitions, African states also demonstrated that they are willing to act on an issue that does not affect them directly, as landmines did, to prevent a weapon to cause future harm in African states.[cx] If African states decide to act in concert with a view to moving the international agenda forward on nuclear disarmament, they would constitute a considerable force that could shape the multilateral agenda on this issue for many years to come.
[i] Observatoire des Armements (2007), ‘The Aftermath of French Nuclear Testing in Algeria’, Damoclès, no. 121, November, CDRPC in Lyon, France, p. 3. To English by Robert M. Davis.
[ii] Oluyemi Adeniji (2002), ‘The Treaty of Pelindaba- on the African Nuclear weapon-free-zone Treaty’, Geneva, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), p. 35.
[iii] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1652 (XVI) ‘Consideration of Africa as a denuclearized zone’, 24.11.1961, available at: http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1652(XVI) (Accessed 06.07.2016).
[iv] GA Resolution 2033 (XX) of 3 December 1965, available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/217/96/IMG/NR021796.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[v] Michael Hamel-Green (2011), ‘Peeling the Orange: Regional paths to a nuclear-weapon-free world’. Disarmament Forum, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), no. 2, p. 7.
[vi] Adeniji (2002), ‘The Treaty of Pelindaba’, p. 49.
[vii] Zaire was the name of the Democratic Republic of the Congo between October 27 1971 and May 17 1997.
[viii] The Treaty of Tlatelolco establishes Latin America and the Caribbean as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It opened for signature in 1967 and entered in force for each country individually. Universality was achieved 23 October 2002, when Cuba ratified the Treaty.
[ix] The Treaty of Rarotonga establishes the South Pacific as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It opened for signature in 1985 and entered into force in 1986.
[x] Adeniji (2002), ‘The Treaty of Pelindaba’, pp. 49-50.
[xi] Adeniji (2002), ‘The Treaty of Pelindaba’, pp. 56-57.
[xii] Adeniji (2002), ‘The Treaty of Pelindaba’, pp. 59-60.
[xiii] Pelindaba is South Africa’s main nuclear research centre, and was the location where South Africa’s atomic bombs were developed in the 1970s and later stored.
[xiv] Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘African Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty)’. Available at: http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/african-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-anwfz-treaty-pelindaba-treaty/ (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[xv] For the latest treaty status, see: http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/treaties/7777-sl-pelindaba_treaty.pdf
[xvi] Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 18.
[xvii] China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
[xviii] Treaty of Pelindaba, Protocol I, Article 1.
[xix] Treaty of Pelindaba, Protocol I, Article 2.
[xx] Treaty of Pelindaba, Protocol II, Article 2 and Protocol III, Article 2.
[xxi] Treaty of Pelindaba, Protocol II, Article 1.
[xxii] Noël Stott (2011), ‘The Treaty of Pelindaba’, pp. 20-21
[xxiii] For pending Treaties in the US Senate, see http://www.foreign.senate.gov/treaties.
[xxiv] Treaty of Pelindaba, Protocol III, Article 1.
[xxv] Stott (2011), ‘The Treaty of Pelindaba’, p. 19.
[xxvi] All Africa, ‘Africa: The African Commission On Nuclear Energy Concludes Its Fifth Ordinary Session’, available at: http://allafrica.com/stories/201505201357.html (Accessed 24.05.2016); Stott, Noël (2011), ‘African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty: an Update. Russia’s Ratification of Protocols and India hopes for an Exemption’. Africa’s Policy Imperatives, Issue 9 October. Institute for Security Studies Africa (ISS), pp. 2-4.
[xxvii] Hamal-Green (2011), ‘Peeling the Orange’, p. 8.
[xxviii] Amelia Broodryk and Noël Stott (2011), ‘Securing Africa’s Nuclear Resources’. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (ISS), p. 6.
[xxix] A programme of the African Union, see www.nepad.org
[xxx] These include Algeria, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia.
[xxxi] International Atomic Energy Agency, ‘The Database on Nuclear Power Reactors (PRIS)’, available at: https://www.iaea.org/pris/ (Accessed: 12.05.2016); World Nuclear Association (2016), World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements’, available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-requireme.aspx (Accessed: 25.05.2016); World Nuclear Association (2016), ‘Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries’, available at: http://world-nuclear.org/information-library/country-profiles/others/emerging-nuclear-energy-countries.aspx (Accessed 25.05.2016).
[xxxii] Broodryk and Stott (2011), ‘Securing Africa’s Nuclear Resources’, pp. 6-7.
[xxxiii] This includes Algeria, Botswana, Central African Republic, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, and Zambia.
[xxxiv] Broodryk and Stott (2011), ‘Securing Africa’s Nuclear Resources’, pp. 6-7.
[xxxv] Federation of American Scientists (2011), ‘Algeria Special Weapons’, available at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/algeria/index.html (Accessed 24.05.2016); Reaching Critical Will (2005), ‘Model Nuclear Inventory’, available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Publications/Inventory-2005/inventory.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[xxxvi] Federation of American Scientists (2011), ‘Algeria Special Weapons’, p. 1.
[xxxvii] Broodryk and Stott (2011), ‘Securing Africa’s Nuclear Resources’, pp. 6-7; Reaching Critical Will (2005), ‘Algeria Special Weapons’.
[xxxviii] Daily Times (2005), ‘Egypt links ratifying CTBT to Israel’s nuclear stance’; Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak, the Arab Republic of Egypt, before the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Fore Of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (2011); Medalia (2007), ‘Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’, p. 26.
[xxxix] Broodryk and Stott (2011), ‘Securing Africa’s Nuclear Resources’, pp. 6-7.
[xl] Federation of American Scientists (2005), ‘Egypt’s Nuclear Weapons Program’, available at: http://fas.org/nuke/guide/egypt/nuke/ (Accessed: 25.05.2016).
[xli] Wilfred Wan (2015), ‘Why the 2015 NPT Review Conference Fell Apart’, UNU-CPR Centre for Policy Research (2014).Available at: http://cpr.unu.edu/why-the-2015-npt-review-conference-fell-apart.html (Accessed 20.05.2016).
[xlii] Julian Borger (2013), ‘Nuclear talks overshadowed by EEgyptian walkout’, The Guardian, 02.05.2013. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/julian-borger-global-security-blog/2013/may/02/nuclear-npt-geneva-egypt (accessed 6 June 2016).
[xliii] Federation of American Scientists (2011), ‘Libya Special Weapons’, available at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/libya/index.html (Accessed 23.05.2016); Global Security, ‘A.Q. Khan & Libya’, available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/khan-libya.htm (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[xliv] Global Security, ‘Libyan nuclear weapons’, available at: http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/libya/nuclear.htm (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[xlv] CNN (2011), ‘Libya military site yields possible radioactive material’, September 23, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2011/09/22/world/africa/libya-war/ (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[xlvi] RiaNovosti (2011), ‘Chemical, nuclear weapons found in Libya –prime minister’, October 31, available at: http://en.rian.ru/world/20111031/168283090.html (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[xlvii] Broodryk and Stott (2011), ‘Securing Africa’s Nuclear Resources’, pp. 6-7.
[xlviii] The other two were Egypt/the United Arab Reoublic and Ethiopia.
[xlix] Adeniji (2002), ‘The Treaty of Pelindaba’, pp. 59-60; Broodryk and Stott (2011), ‘Securing Africa’s Nuclear Resources’, p. 6.
[l] De-Alerting group, ‘Cluster Nuclear Weapons: De-alerting- Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems’, statement by H.E. Mr. Alexandre Fasel, Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the Conference on Disarmament, October 13, 2011, New York, available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com11/statements/13Oct_Switzerland%20(de-alerting%20group).pdf (Accessed 24.05.2016).
The De-alerting Group consists of Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nigeria, and Switzerland.
[li] Broodryk and Stott (2011), ‘Securing Africa’s Nuclear Resources’, pp. 6-7.
[lii] Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine gave up the nuclear weapons they inherited when the Soviet Union imploded in 1991.
[liii] Barletta, Michael and Christina Ellington (1999), ‘South Africa’s Nuclear Weapons Program: An Annotated Chronology, 1969-1994’. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. March, p. 5. Peaceful nuclear explosions are nuclear explosions conducted for non-military purposes. The Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNET) of 1976 (entered into force in 1990) between the U.S. and the USSR governs all nuclear explosions carried out at locations outside the weapons test sites specified under the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests of 1974 (entered into force in 1990) – also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
For the PNET text, see: http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/pne1.html#2 (Accessed: 24.05.2016).
For the Threshold Test Ban Treaty text, see: http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/ttbt1.html#2 Accessed: 24.05.2016).
[liv] Federation of American Scientists (1999), ‘Nuclear Weapons Program’, available at: http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/rsa/nuke/index.html (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[lv] World Nuclear Association (2016), ‘World Nuclear Power Reactors & Uranium Requirements’, available at: http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/facts-and-figures/world-nuclear-power-reactors-and-uranium-requireme.aspx (Accessed: 25.05.2016).
[lvi] Broodryk and Stott (2011), ‘Securing Africa’s Nuclear Resources’, pp. 6-7.
[lvii] For more information, see Verne Harris, Sello Hatang and Peter Lieberman (2004), ‘Unveiling South Africa’s nuclear past’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30, pp. 3, 457–476.
[lviii] David Fig (2010), ‘Nuclear energy rethink? The rise and demise of South Africa’s PBMR’, ISS Paper 210, Institute for Security Studies, p. 7.
[lix] Sethi (2011), ‘Conference On Disarmament’; Republic of South Africa (2011), ‘Conference on Disarmament’.
[lx] Broodryk (2011), ‘Seoul Searching ‘, p. 2.
[lxi] African Union (2011), ‘AU in a nutshell’, available at: http://www.au.int/en/about/nutshell (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[lxii] Stott (2011), ‘The Treaty of Pelindaba’, p. 16.
[lxiii] Stott et al. (2011), ‘Africa’s Development’, p. 2.
[lxiv] Statement by Indonesia on behalf of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) at the General Debate of the First Committee on All Disarmament and International Security Agenda Items. New York, October 3, 2011, p. 3, available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/1com/1com11/statements/3Oct_NAM.pdf (Accessed 27.05.2016).
[lxv] NAC is composed of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and South Africa. Slovenia and Sweden were founding members, but subsequently left the group.
[lxvi] See separate ILPI ‘in a nutshell’ for more information on the NPT.
[lxvii] Stott et al. (2011), ‘Africa’s Development’, p. 2.
[lxviii] See Torbjørn G. Hugo and Kjølv Egeland, ‘Jumping the Hurdles’, ILPI WMD Project, Background Paper no. 11, 2014.
[lxix] See e.g. Jo-Ansie van Wyk, ‘South Africa’s Post-Apartheid Nuclear Diplomacy’, Insight on Africa, vol. 7, no. 2, 2015, pp. 108–19.
[lxx] Miguel Marín-Bosch, ‘Getting Rid of Nuclear Weapons’, Medicine, Conflict, and Survival, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 282–300, p. 284.
[lxxi] 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, Final Document, Volume I, Part I, p. 14.
[lxxii] See e.g. Harald Müller, ‘A Treaty in Troubled Waters:’, The International Spectator, vol. 40, no. 3, 2005, pp. 33–44, pp. 34–5.
[lxxiii] Harald Müller, ‘A Treaty in Troubled Waters: Reflection on the Failed NPT Review Conference’, The International Spectator, vol. 40, no.3, 2005, pp. 33–44, p. 35.
[lxxiv] John Simpson and Jenny Nielsen, ‘The 2005 NPT Review Conference’, The Nonproliferation Review, vol. 12, no. 2, 2005, pp. 271–301, p. 286.
[lxxv] William C. Potter, ‘The NPT Review Conference: 188 States in Search of Consensus’, The International Spectator, vol. 40, no.3, 2005, pp. 19–31, p. 22.
[lxxvi] NPT/CONF. 1995/32 (Part 1), Annex, Resolution on the Middle East, available at: http://www.un.org/Depts/ddar/nptconf/2142.htm (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[lxxvii] Stott et al. (2011), ‘Africa’s Development’, p. 2; Hubert et al. (2010), ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’, pp. 4-5.
[lxxviii] See the Model Nuclear Weapons Convention submitted by Costa Rica to the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Porliferation of Nuclear Weapons 1 May 2007, available at: http://lcnp.org/mnwc/ (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[lxxix] Potter, William, Patricia Lewis, Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova and Miles Pomper (2010), ‘The 2010 NPT Review Conference: Deconstructing Consensus’. CNS Special Report. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Monterey Institute of International Studies. June 17, pp. 7-8, available at: https://safeguardscourse.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/2010_npt_review_conference_cns.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[lxxx] Non-Aligned Movement, ‘Report of Main Committee I: Chairman’s Draft on Substantive Elements (NAM Position as of 16 May 2010). 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, pp. 12-13, available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2010/statements/19May_MCI_NAM.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[lxxxi] Potter et al. (2010), ‘The 2010 NPT Review Conference’, pp. 7–8.
[lxxxii] Statement of H.E. Ambassador Maged Abdelaziz, Permanent Representative of Egypt to the United Nations on behalf of the NAM States Parties to the NPT, before the 16th Plenary Meeting of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. New York, 28 May, 2010, p.4, available at: http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Statement/5.28.10statement.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[lxxxiii] Hubert et al. (2010), ‘Keep Calm and Carry On’, p. 7.
[lxxxiv] Reaching Critical Will (2011), ‘UN General Assembly First Committee’. Available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/unga (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[lxxxv] Reaching Critical Will (2011), ‘UN General Assembly First Committee’.
[lxxxvi] For more information on the Conference on Disarmament see ILPI’s article on the issue, available at http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=1191, (Accessed: 25.05.2016).
[lxxxvii] Nuclear Threat Initiative, ‘Conference on Disarmament (CD)’, available at: http://www.nti.org/learn/treaties-and-regimes/conference-on-disarmament/ (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[lxxxviii] Reaching Critical Will, ‘Conference on Disarmament’, available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/disarmament-fora/others/cd#membership (Accessed 11.07.2016).
[lxxxix] United Nations Office at Geneva (2016), ‘Conference on Disarmament’, available at: http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/2D415EE45C5FAE07C12571800055232B?OpenDocument (Accessed 23.05.2016); United Nations Office at Geneva (2011), ‘Conference on Disarmament: Member states’, available at: http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/6286395D9F8DABA380256EF70073A846?OpenDocument (Accessed 23.05.2016); Sethi, Manpreet (2011), ‘Conference On Disarmament: Groping Its Way Around’, available at: http://www.idsa-india.org/an-nov9-3.html (Accessed 23.05.2016); Republic of South Africa (2011) ‘Conference on Disarmament’, available at: http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/inter/cd.htm (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[xc] CD’s Rules of Procedures are available at: http://www.unog.ch/80256EDD006B8954/(httpAssets)/1F072EF4792B5587C12575DF003C845B/$file/RoP.pdf (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[xci] Sethi (2011), ‘Conference On Disarmament’; United Nations Office at Geneva (2011), ‘Conference on Disarmament: Member states’.
[xcii] See for instance statement given by the Philipinnes on behalf of IGOS in February 2011, available at: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/cd/2011/statements/part1/22Feb_Philippines.pdf (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[xciii] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization (2014), ‘African Ambassadors Discuss CTBT Entry Into Force’ https://www.ctbto.org/press-centre/highlights/2014/african-ambassadors-discuss-ctbt-entry-into-force/ (Accessed 23.05.2016)
[xciv] Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, Article XIV, available at: http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/content/treaty/treaty_text.pdf (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[xcv] Statement by H.E. Ambassador Mahmoud Mubarak, Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Arab Republic of Egypt, before the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Fore Of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. New York, 11-13 November 2011, (Unofficial translation), available at: http://www.un.org/webcast/ctbt/statements/egyptE.htm (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[xcvi] Jonathan Medalia (2007), ‘Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty’. CRS Report for Congress, May 3, p. 26, Congressional Research Service, available at: https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=473921 (Accessed 23.05.2016.
[xcvii] Statement by the Delegation of the Arab Republic of Egypt before the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), New York, September 23, 2011, available at: http://www.ctbto.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Art_14_2011/Statements/Egypt.pdf (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[xcviii] 1540 Committee. United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004). http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/ (Accessed: 24.05.2016), Resolution available at: https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement (Accessed 24.05.2016).
[xcix] Dominique Dye (2008), ‘African perspectives on countering weapons of mass destruction’. ISS paper 167, September. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies, pp. 1-3; United Nations, ‘United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004)’, available at: http://www.un.org/sc/1540/ (Accessed 23.05.2016); United Nations, ‘1540 Committee: National Reports’, available at: http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/national-reports.shtml (Accessed 25.05.2016).
[c] Dye (2008), ‘African perspectives’, pp. 4–5.
[ci] Amelia Broodryk and Noël Stott (2012), ‘Challenges and Solutions for 1540 Implementation in the African Region’, 1540 Compass: Section Two, Regional and National Focus, Institute for Security Studies, available at: http://cits.uga.edu/1540compass/article/challenges-and-solutions-for-1540-implementation-in-the-african-region (Accessed 25.05.2016).
[cii] Institute for Security Studies, ’How is Africa putting resolution 1540 in practice?’, 26 August 2015, https://www.issafrica.org/events/how-is-africa-putting-resolution-1540-into-practice (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[ciii] Darlene Superville and Josh Lederman (2016), ’World leaders urge action against terrorism at Nuclear Security Summit’, PBS Newshour, 2 April, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/world-leaders-urge-action-against-terrorism-at-nuclear-security-summit (Accessed 23.05.2016)
[civ] Broodryk (2011), ‘Seoul Searching’, pp. 1–2.
[cv] Office of the Press Secretary, The White House (2010), ‘Work Plan of the Washington Nuclear Security Summit’, April 13, available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/work-plan-washington-nuclear-security-summit (Accessed 23.05.2016).
[cvi] Broodryk (2011), ‘Seoul Searching’, pp. 1–2.
[cvii] Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (2016), ‘Sustaining Progress in Nuclear Security Without the Summits – an African View’ http://thebulletin.org/what-path-nuclear-security-beyond-2016-summit/sustaining-progress-nuclear-security-without-summits—-african-view (Accessed: 25.05.2016).
[cviii] The other eight were Argentina, Brazil, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatamala, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Mexico.
[cix] International Law and Policy Institute (2016), Counting to Zero. Available at: http://nwp.ilpi.org/?p=2165. (Accessed: 25.05.2016).
[cx] For more information on the how the Convention on Cluster Munitions was won and the role of African states, see John Borrie (2009), Uancceptable Harm. A History of How the Treaty to Ban Cluster Munitions Was Won, New York and Geneva, UNIDIR; Gugu Dube (2009), ‘Negotiating the Convention on Cluster Munitions, The Role of African States’, ISS Paper 187, June, Institute for Security Studies.