Obstacles and opportunities for inclusive multilateral disarmament
Disarmament and international security is an issue that concerns all state in the world, yet not all states have traditionally been active in moving this agenda forward. In this background paper we take a closer look at the numbers behind the assumption, with a particular focus on recent multilateral arms control and disarmament meetings. The data show, not surprisingly, that developing states tend to be underrepresented on these arenas, but also that certain measures seem to be effective in terms of increasing their participation. We analyse and discuss some of the root causes of this ‘development gap’, and end with a set of policy recommendations that stakeholders may want to consider in their efforts to improve the inclusiveness of multilateral disarmament processes.
|Background Paper No 13/2014||Published: December 2014|
- 1 Introduction
- 2 The problem: are developing countries less engaged?
- 3 The reasons: what are the obstacles to inclusive multilateral disarmament?
- 4 Solutions: how may developing country participation be increased?
- 5 Conclusion
- 6 Interview list
- 7 Endnotes
Developing countries have left their mark on several recent disarmament processes. By deliberately challenging the traditional disarmament discourse, in which military and security policy language has typically abounded, the more recent disarmament processes have sprung out of a broader discussion of human security. Through the testimony of survivors and comprehensive documentation of the humanitarian consequences of various weapons, affected developing states have been able to bring the humanitarian perspective to the forefront of the disarmament discourse. The persistent work to prohibit anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions finally resulted in strong international treaties in 1997 and 2008 respectively. In both instances, developing countries of various regions were key actors in the processes leading up to the negotiating conference and the conferences themselves. Similarly, the effort at controlling the international trade in arms resulting in the Arms Trade Treaty adopted in 2013 had several developing countries as its linchpins.
However, despite the acknowledgement that developing countries have contributed greatly to recently adopted instruments, there is nevertheless a commonly held assumption that developing countries are not as well represented in multilateral processes as they could be. Particularly when the dust settles and diplomatic negotiating conferences turn into preparatory committee meetings and review cycles, many developing countries tend to disappear from the scene. The aim of this paper is to investigate this commonly held assumption, and, based on the findings, consider possible measures that the international community may take in order to increase the participation of developing states in multilateral disarmament processes.
The paper is divided into three parts. In the first section, we examine the problem: Is it true that developing countries are underrepresented in disarmament forums and have poorer institutional capacity? As it happens, the answer is a bit mixed. Developing countries demonstrate large variation in their engagement depending on the forum, issue in question, and availability of sponsorship. Taking the empirical data outlined in the first section as a point of departure, the second section is an attempt at explaining the empirical pattern: Why is it that developing countries are underrepresented in some forums, but both present and active in others? What are the obstacles to inclusive multilateral disarmament, and diplomacy more generally? Our results indicate that inadequate financial and human resources often force developing countries to prioritize other development issues, such as poverty reduction and health. Finally, in the third section, we propose possible ways of addressing the issue: How might developing countries jump over the hurdles, with a view to increase their participation and engagement in international disarmament initiatives and achieve more effective diplomatic agencies? We suggest that more sponsorship programmes would have a particularly positive effect on the participation of developing countries, as the increased presence at disarmament conferences is the key factor that determines inclusiveness, representation, and legitimacy.
The problem: are developing countries less engaged?
Engagement in international processes and initiatives is difficult to measure. In this study, we use three main indicators: (1) ratification of international legal instruments; (2) presence in international forums and conferences; and (3) statements given in such contexts.
Figure 1 (above) shows what percentage of the world’s developed, developing, and least developed countries (LDCs) are parties to the core disarmament treaties of international law. The total number of states in each category is listed in Table 1. The categorization is based on the OECD list of states eligible for Official Development Assistance (ODA). The figure indicates that, on average, fewer developing countries are parties to the core disarmament treaties of international law, and that the group of least developed countries generally has the poorest ratification record. While the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) (1993) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) (1968) enjoy close to universal adherence, a somewhat smaller fraction of the world’s developing countries relative to that of developed ones are parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) (1972), the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) (1997), and more evidently, the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) (2008), and the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). Interestingly, all but two of the LDCs are parties to the APMBC, yielding a higher percentage than either the developed or the other developing states. One reason for this could be that many of the LDCs have been directly affected by the use of such weapons. The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) adopted in 2013 is not strictly a disarmament treaty, but like the abovementioned treaties, it is at least in part grounded in humanitarian considerations and a need to regulate the use and transfer of weapons. Being the most recently adopted of the six treaties investigated, the ATT shows the largest difference between developed and developing states in terms of treaty ratification.
Figure 2 shows the fraction of states that were in attendance at the most recent multilateral meetings pertaining to the aforementioned treaties. In general, the numbers confirm the assumption that development status is clearly correlated with degree of participation. What is interesting, however, is that the pattern only seems to be valid for the meetings that take place in Geneva or New York. For the Fourth Meeting of States Parties to the CCM (Lusaka, Zambia, September 2013) and for the Third Review Conference of States Parties to the APMBC (Maputo, Mozambique, June 2014) the percentage of participating LDCs was actually higher than for the other developing countries. And for the CCM meeting, it was even higher than for the developed states. To a large extent, this could be attributed to the fact that both the CCM meeting and the APMBC meeting had sponsorship programmes administered by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). This meant that all of the LDCs could get expenses covered. As mentioned above, another reason for the high participation by LDCs in Lusaka and Maputo could also be the fact that many of these states have a particular interest in the issues in question (cluster munitions and land-mines).
…the numbers confirm the assumption that development status is clearly correlated with degree of participation
With the exception of the ATT, which had very high attendance from all three categories of states, it also appears that the rate of participation does not differ significantly between New York and Geneva. The ATT should be seen as an exception in this case, since the meeting in question was the final round of negotiations on the treaty text. But the numbers were probably also boosted by a genuine interest in the issue at stake. Unrestricted trade of conventional weapons is a serious problem for a large number of developing states—a matter of life and death, as many have put it. It should be noted, however, that the ATT is not a disarmament treaty; it regulates trade in conventional arms.
Figure 3 (above) further dissects the various groups’ participation, showing the average number of delegates of each country in each category at said conferences. The number is calculated from the number of states that took part in the conferences in question, as shown in Figure 2. For the case of the APMBC, for example, this means that the average number of participants is calculated from the basis of the 92 states that participated, not from the 162 states that are actually parties to the APMBC. Of these 92 states, 34 were developed states, 35 developing states, and 23 were least developed states. What the figure shows is that on average the developed countries have a considerably higher number of participants than the developing and least developed states. For instance, at the November 2013 CWC meeting in Geneva, developed countries sent on average 7,8 delegates, compared with the 4,7 and 3,4 delegates sent by developing and least developed states. The same tendency was displayed at the NPT meeting in New York in May 2014. At the CCM meeting in Lusaka in September 2013, the numbers were more even, with 3,0 delegates for the developed, and 2,5 delegates for both the developing and least developed states.
In other words, what the participant lists from the meetings of the different treaties indicate is that there is a clear correlation between development status and the degree of participation in multilateral disarmament meetings, not only in terms of the number of states that show up, but also in terms of the number of delegates they send to each meeting. This broadly confirms the basic assumption of the paper, namely that developing states are underrepresented in multilateral disarmament processes.
Figure 4 (above) shows the three group’s average number of staff at the UN Missions in Geneva and New York, the two most important hubs for multilateral disarmament diplomacy. Of the 198 states included in the study, 195 of them have a permanent mission in New York, and 174 of them have a permanent mission in Geneva. All developed states have permanent missions in both cities. As for the developing and least developed states, the fractions of states with permanent representation in Geneva are 83 and 84 per cent respectively. Since the presence in New York and Geneva is relatively high for all groups, a more interesting test is to compare the size of these missions, rather than their existence.
As expected, developed countries have a considerably higher number of staff than developing countries both in New York and in Geneva. In Geneva, the least developed countries are the most modestly represented group, with just over six staffers on average—less than half the average number for the developed countries (13,4). Geneva is one of the most important cities in the world in a disarmament perspective. It hosts the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the CCW, the Group of Governmental Experts, and the BTWC, and has been the location for several meetings of State Parties to the APMBC. While not as heavily focused on disarmament as the UN in Geneva, the UN headquarters in New York is also highly relevant for disarmament, hosting the NPT twice every five years, the UN Disarmament Commission, and the First Committee of the General Assembly, which is the most important body of the UN dealing specifically with international security and disarmament. Here the number of staff is higher over all, but the gap between the three groups is nevertheless wider, with the least developed states having on average 8 staffers, compared with 19 for the developed countries.
In sum, the numbers suggest that developing states (1) are parties to fewer treaties, (2) have lower participation rates in multilateral meetings, (3) send fewer delegates when they do participate, and (4) have fewer staff available to participate in meetings that take place in either New York or Geneva.
The reasons: what are the obstacles to inclusive multilateral disarmament?
Lack of financial resources
Developing countries still have a way to go before they match the participation rates of the developed countries. A first reason for this, highlighted by several of the stakeholders interviewed for this study, is the simple fact that developing states are more pressed for financial resources than developed states.
…lack of resources is the most common cause of absence
Many developing countries have understaffed permanent missions in Geneva and New York, forcing them to prioritise their attendance in various meetings. Many disarmament initiatives, workshops, and roundtables are organized outside the traditional disarmament forums and disarmament cities. In such cases, appointed delegations have to be assembled and sent to the selected location, which of course also costs money. According to most of the individuals interviewed, the lack of resources is the most common cause of absence. As an example, one interviewee stated that international organizations receive requests to “financially or logistically support photocopies of ratification documentation for parliamentarians […] The biggest obstacles are very practical ones”.
Institutional and human resources
A second hurdle that was widely reported among the respondents is the lower institutional and human capacity of developing countries. Such capacity is arguably closely linked with the availability of financial resources: Lack of financial resources impedes many small developing countries from building relevant expertise and networks of information. According to one diplomat from a small developing country, the biggest challenge her country faces in participating constructively in multilateral disarmament processes is quite simply “lack of information and resources”.
With few exceptions, multilateral disarmament discussions take place in either Geneva or New York, and as discussed above, the size of the permanent missions of least developed countries is roughly half that of developed countries. The effect is that the diplomats from developing countries tend to have much larger portfolios than their counterparts from developed countries, and consequently much less time to spend on each issue. And quite often, a single issue can block the schedule of diplomats for weeks at the time. As an example, the Review Conference of the NPT in May 2015 is scheduled to last for 4 full weeks. Consequently, developing countries have no other choice than to prioritize both their attendance and efforts, making their participation in disarmament discussions irregular. That causes another problem, which is that diplomats from developing countries are not as up to date on the international processes as they may have liked to be, causing them to take less active roles when they are in fact present.
In addition to having limited capacity at their diplomatic missions, capacity may also be lacking in developing countries’ capitals. According to one interviewee, there is a “lack of capacity at the ministerial level in capitals. Ministerial staff is either stretched (small teams tackling many files) or lacking proper training/information, or totally lacking funds.”
Ministerial staff is either stretched […] or lacking proper training
Disarmament discussions are furthermore typically quite technical, often requiring in-depth knowledge of specific issues. Since developing countries’ diplomatic staffs on average have lower capacity—with few people spread out over a wide range of issues—they also tend to lack personnel with expert competence on one or a few issues. One interviewee opined that lack of information posed an important obstacle for developing country participation. One example is the discourse on nuclear weapons, which has developed surprisingly fast over the past few years, arguably making it difficult for diplomats with large portfolios to keep up. Disarmament discussions furthermore often revolve around intricate questions of international humanitarian law or the technical specificities of weapon systems. Developing the necessary human capital can be costly, and flying experts around where they are needed—for example from other missions, delegations, or from their capitals—also represents massive financial and human resource costs for small low-income countries.
Due to the lack of resources, many developing countries tend to lean on the position of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)—“too much”, according to one respondent.  The result is that national preferences among NAM-members often drown in the unified position drafted by a small number of key states. For example, the NAM regularly expresses its confidence in the Conference on Disarmament, which has not produced any substantive outcome for nearly two decades, and where 88 members of the NAM do not even have the right to participate.
A third obstacle—related to the two above—is lack of interest or priority. Countries with scarce resources often have to make hard choices between pressing issues such as poverty reduction, human rights, disarmament, health, and education. In general, they will opt to focus on the issues they deem most important. The perception of what is considered important is of course malleable, but in many developing countries, the public and civil society often struggle to influence decision-makers, which means that even though the population would like to see their country take an active role on a certain issue, their governments feel little pressure to implement it.
Having an interest in an issue obviously has a positive effect on participation, and when resources are scarce, prioritization becomes all the more important. In addition to direct national interest, interviewees from some developing countries that had not themselves been directly affected by the weapons in question, reported that their support for disarmament had been motivated out of solidarity with affected countries in their region or elsewhere. They also knew that they too could be affected in the future. Developing countries’ interest in multilateral disarmament can thus be understood to have been driven both by an idealistic sense of shared responsibility and humanitarianism, as well as national security interests more strictly defined. The APMBC is a good example of this: African developing countries were highly engaged in the efforts for a strong and effective ban, and have been actively involved in subsequent meetings of States Parties to the treaty. This is in stark contrast to the CCW meetings, where developing countries have been much more reversed in both their support for the treaty and in their level of activity and participation in meetings.
The tendency seems to be that when the link between a weapon system and a given country becomes more abstract or distant, developing countries become less active. For example, the CCW Protocols on non-detectable fragments, incendiary weapons, and Blinding Laser Weapons (Protocols 1, 3, and 4), address weapons that never existed or are no longer in use, and have failed to attract the attention of most developing countries.
Developing countries cannot afford to waste their time
Interviewees also reported that developing countries—due to limited capacity—engage more actively in disarmament processes with a high probability of a relatively quick (and successful) outcome, or with a clear momentum. Developing countries cannot afford to waste their time. For example, the processes that led to the adoption of the APMBC and the CCM (in which developing countries were particularly active) took place over just 11 and 15 months respectively. Compared to the amount of time it often takes for states just to agree on an agenda for disarmament discussions, these processes were brought to a successful conclusion relatively quickly. Affected developing countries were highly motivated by the immediate benefits the two conventions would bring, including their comprehensive implementation frameworks, and their provisions for international cooperation and assistance. The motivating effect of a dynamic and open process could help explain why the share of developing countries present at the conferences on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons grew markedly at the second conference in Nayarit (63 per cent of least developed countries were present in Oslo and 76 per cent in Nayarit the following year). Knowing that the Oslo Conference had been successful and promising, developing countries probably felt that their human resources would not be wasted going to the second one.
Solutions: how may developing country participation be increased?
UN organisations, the ICRC, and civil society—at both local and international levels—have played an important role in raising developing countries’ awareness and understanding of disarmament issues. They have fostered participation and built developing countries’ capacity to engage effectively in multilateral disarmament processes. Publications, briefings, and side events held in the margins of international meetings have been important. By gaining more knowledge and understanding of the issues at stake, states are better able to take positions and to decide whether a certain disarmament process or instrument is in their national interest. But it is not enough.
An obvious way in which to help developing countries clear the economic hurdle is to remove it. For a number of multilateral disarmament instruments this has already been done. Sponsorship programmes exist for the ATT, the CCW, the APMBC, and the CCM, but developing countries still report that the economic obstacle is a big problem. At the 2011 Review Conference of the BTWC, it was determined that a sponsorship programme should be established also for the BTWC. The NPT and the CWC do not have sponsorship programmes.
A first and obvious way to enhance the participation and influence of developing countries, then—given the fact that developing countries still report that the financial obstacle is so high—is to streamline the sponsorship programmes currently in place, and to establish new ones. Another measure could be to target Official Development Assistance (ODA) at particular areas or budget posts in the foreign service of developing countries. As noted above, lacking basic things such as photocopies is obviously a hindrance for an effective diplomatic corps.
It could be argued that there is less need for sponsorship programmes for instruments that are hosted in diplomatic hubs where most countries have permanent representation. On the other hand, the numbers presented in this study clearly show that even for meetings in Geneva and New York, the limited capacity of the permanent missions means that participation of developing states is much lower than for developed states. If the level of participation and the capacity to engage is to be increased, this means that developing states either need support aimed at increasing the size of their missions, or for sponsorship programmes to be established that would allow developing states to participate with delegates from capital.
Sponsorship programmes should not only cover meetings in Geneva of New York, however. As Figures 2 and 3 illustrate, meetings that take place elsewhere is also highly dependent on financial support to participants from developing countries. For the conference series on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, this has so far been very successful. Of the 128 states that participated in the first conference in Oslo in March 2013, 72 received financial sponsorship. For the second conference in Mexico in February 2014, 82 of the 146 participating states received financial support.
…efforts should be made to induce developed states to contribute more funds to sponsorship programmes
Several of the interviewees noted that the number of sponsors is limited, and that efforts should be made to induce developed states to contribute more funds to sponsorship programmes. Respondents also noted that there was a great potential to streamline the implementation of existing programmes so as to reduce their management costs. Sponsorship programmes should be continuously reviewed and tailored to the target group.
Group coordination and leadership
Regional conferences, roundtables, and workshops offer valuable opportunities for diplomats and civil society actors to coordinate their positions and deepen their knowledge of disarmament issues. For example, regional conferences on cluster munitions held in Africa, Asia, and Latin America played a central role in garnering support for the process leading up to the CCM.More informal roundtable meetings can also be valuable arenas for capacity building, and it also provides opportunities for diplomats to focus their attention on one issue at the time. These meetings can be organized by states, but also by international organizations and other civil society actors.
Another way for developing countries to overcome the constraints of limited resources is to pool them. For example, in the cluster munitions process, many African states realized that they had similar interests, and were thus in a position to distribute responsibility for the different aspects of the process across a group of countries. Such division of responsibility could provide valuable lessons for how to approach other disarmament issues. The simplified version of the argument is that if Africa were a country, it would have 564 permanent mission staff in New York and 397 diplomats in Geneva.
Increased ownership in implementing international conventions has also proven to be an effective way of engaging developing countries. The implementation of both the APMBC and the CCM are supported each year by “standing committees” and “working-groups” co-chaired by States Parties selected through a process that seeks a balance between affected countries and donor countries while at the same time ensuring a regional balance. One interviewee noted that co-chairing international conferences is a fruitful way of engaging developing countries in disarmament initiatives.
Leadership—both at the regional and international levels—is another vital component in generating the support and engagement required to negotiate and adopt international disarmament instruments. For example, during the Oslo Process on cluster munitions, Norway’s leadership and efforts to bring both humanitarian considerations and the views of developing and affected states to the forefront of the discussion was fundamental to its success. On the regional level, Zambia played a very important role in generating broad African support for a strong and comprehensive CCM. During the process on anti-personnel landmines, Mozambique had assumed a similar role in Africa.In Latin America and the Caribbean, Mexico, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Jamaica have been important in garnering regional support for various disarmament initiatives.
Civil society engagement
Civil society plays an important role in public awareness raising and sensitizing of governments. Often, civil society can also function as banks of information and expertise for states to draw from. According to one respondent, developing countries’ participation in the processes to ban anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions would not have been so prominent were it not for the strong collaboration between a core group of countries (some of which funded sponsorship programmes), international organizations such as the UN, the ICRC, and the civil society. Financial and institutional support for civil society actors in developing countries could be an effective way to boost developing countries’ interest in disarmament issues. NGOs and activists should aim to show how specific disarmament issues are relevant to their countries of origin.
Financial and institutional support for civil society actors in developing countries could be an effective way to boost developing countries’ interest in disarmament issues
Lastly, capacity building is a helpful tool to build human and institutional resources. For example, the fellowship programme managed by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) has helped some 600 officials from 160 Member States familiarize themselves with the work of institutions engaged in the areas of international disarmament, non-proliferation, arms control, and security issues. In turn, fellows from the programme have often become focal points in the disarmament communities in their countries of origin. However, there is both need and demand for more such opportunities to be created. For example, states, disarmament organizations, and universities could partner around the development of online courses and workshops. As another positive example, Mexico has recently established a summer school for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation at the Diplomatic Academy of Mexico.
This study has demonstrated that on average, developing countries have poorer records on ratification and participation in multilateral disarmament processes. Understandably, developing countries have often limited their engagement in disarmament to issues they feel they have a particular stake in, or to processes they feel have a reasonable chance of producing actual results. Inadequate financial and human resources often force developing countries to prioritize other development issues (e.g. poverty reduction and health issues).
If disarmament efforts are to be truly inclusive, legitimate, and representative, the participation of developing countries is a prerequisite. The data used in this study indicate that sponsorship programmes have a positive effect on the participation of developing countries. Several of the interviewed stakeholders also underlined a need for more sponsored capacity building measures in the form of informal regional meetings, workshops, and courses. There is also a need to support civil society in developing countries both institutionally and financially. Lastly, developing countries should further strengthen regional solidarity and cooperation in order to maximise the return of their efforts.
Interview (1), e-mail interview with IGO employee, 7 May 2014.
Interview (2), e-mail interview with foreign service official from African state, 9 May 2014.
Interview (3), e-mail interview with employee of non-governmental organization (NGO), 12 May 2014.
Interview (4), e-mail interview with Foreign Service official from European state, 15 May 2014.
Interview (5), e-mail interview with Foreign Service official from Oceanian state, 22 May 2014.
Interview (6), e-mail interview with NGO, 23 May 2014.
Interview (7), e-mail interview with IGO employee, 26 May 2014.
Interview (8), e-mail interview with IGO employee, 28 May 2014.
Interview (9), e-Mail interview with Foreign Service official from African state, 29 May 2014.
Interview (10), telephone interview with Foreign Service official from African state, May 2014.
Interview (11), telephone interview with Foreign Service official from Asian state, May 2014.
Interview (12), telephone interview with Foreign Service official from Latin American state, May 2014.
Interview (13), telephone interview with Foreign Service official from European state, May 2014.
Interview (14), telephone interview with Foreign Service official from Latin American state, May 2014.
Interview (15), telephone interview with employee of intergovernmental organization (IGO), May 2014.
Interview (16), telephone interview with IGO employee, May 2014.
Interview (17), telephone interview with NGO employee, May 2014.
Interview (18), telephone interview with NGO employee, May 2014.
Interview (19), e-mail interview with IGO employee, 29 May–2 June 2014.
Interview (20), e-mail interview with IGO employee, 15 September 2014.
 See for example Statement by Kanat Saudabayev, Director of the Nazarbayev Center, on the impact the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in Kazakhstan delivered at the International Conference on the Humanitarian Consequences of Nuclear Weapons delivered in Oslo on March 4-5, 2013, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/hum_saudabayev.pdf (accessed 12.05.2014).
 On 25 September 2014, the ratification-threshold for the entry into force of the Arms Trade Treaty was passed with the submission of instruments of ratification to the UN General Assembly by eight countries. See Reaching Critical Will’s commentary, “Arms Trade Treaty Set to Enter into Force with 50th Ratification”, 25 September 2014. Available from: http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/news/latest-news/9099-arms-trade-treaty-set-to-enter-into-force-with-50th-ratification.
 See International Monetary Fund (IMF), “World Economic Outlook” from April 2014 for the IMF’s classification of developing and developed (advanced) countries used in this paper.
 See the World Bank’s database, “Least Developed Countries” available at http://data.worldbank.org/region/LDC).
 OECD, “DAC List of ODA Recipients Effective for reporting on 2012 and 2013 flows”, available at: http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/DAC%20List%20used%20for%202012%20and%202013%20flows.pdf.
 OECD, “Fragile States 2013: Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World”, http://www.oecd.org/dac/incaf/FragileStates2013.pdf (accessed 08.05.2014).
 See Gro Nystuen and Kjølv Egeland, “The Potential of the Arms Trade Treaty to Reduce Violations of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law” in Cecilia M. Bailliet and Kjetil M. Larsen (eds), Promoting Peace Through International Law, Oxford University Press, forthcoming 2014.
 At the time of writing, the participant list for the 5th MSP of the CCM (Costa Rica in September 2014) was not yet published.
 The GGE is convened to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. See The UN Office at Geneva, “Disarmament”, http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/B8A3B48A3FB7185EC1257B280045DBE3?OpenDocument (accessed 16.07.2014).
 The majority of the interviews were undertaken during the month of May in 2014, and included individuals from a number of different countries (both developed and developing) and from international organizations.
 Interview (8).
 Interview (2).
 The CCM and APMBC Meeting of States Parties and Review Conference take place every other year in an affected country or a State Party, and the Preparatory Committee Meetings for the NPT take place in Vienna every five years. The Chemical Weapons Convention (the OPCW) is located at The Hague.
 For example, in 2014, the Conference on Disarmament met over one week, the APMBT and the CCM will take up to 4-5 weeks and the CCW will take up to 13 days of formal meetings in addition to preparatory meetings taking place in Geneva. To that, should be added NPT related meetings, the General Assembly First Committee as well as international meetings on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons, as well as meetings related to the ATT and the UN PoA.
 Interview (19).
 Interview (1).
 Interview (6) and (9).
 Interview (8) and (9).
 Interviews (8) and (19).
 Interviews (8) and (9).
 The Oslo Declaration on Cluster Munitions was signed in February 2007, and the Convention on Cluster Munitions was concluded in Dublin in May 2008, see: http://www.clusterconvention.org/the-convention/history/ (accessed 12.05.2014). The “Ottawa process” was launched in October 1996 and the APMBC was adopted in September 1997, see: http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/580 (accessed 12.05.2014)
 Interviews (4), (9), and (19).
 John Borrie, Unacceptable Harm, Geneva: UNIDIR, 2009, p. 317.
 UNODA, “Biological Weapons Convention”, 2011 Comprehensive Review Conference, http://www.un.org/disarmament/content/news/bwc_2011/ (accessed 30 September 2014).
 Interview (20). The sponsorship programme for the conference series on the humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons is managed by UNDP. Funding for the Oslo Conference was provided by Norway. Funding for the Nayarit Conference was provided by Ireland, New Zealand, and Norway.
 Interviews (4) and (19).
 Interviews (4), (16), and (19).
 Landmine Monitor, Banning Cluster Munitions: Government Policy and Practice, Toronto: St. Joseph Communications, 2009.
 Jody William, Stephen D. Goose, and Mary Wareham, “Banning Landmines: Disarmament, Citizen Diplomacy, and Human Security”, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Chapter 6, 2008; See for example the list of the CCM Coordinators available at http://www.clusterconvention.org/documents/cc-meetings/ (accessed 04/06/2014).
 Interview (16).
 Gro Nystuen and Stein-Ivar Lothe Eide, “Wanted: Resolute Normative Leadership”, European Leadership Network, 5 September 2013, http://www.europeanleadershipnetwork.org/wanted-resolute-normative-leadership_768.html (accessed 18.07.2014).
 “Country Profile: Norway”, The Cluster Munitions Monitor 2009, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2009&pqs_type=cm&pqs_report=norway&pqs_section= (accessed 04.06.2014)
 “Country Profile: Zambia”, Cluster Munitions Monitor 2009, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=2009&pqs_type=cm&pqs_report=zambia&pqs_section= (accessed 04.06.2014).
 “Country Profile: Mozambique”, Landmine Monitor 1999, http://www.the-monitor.org/index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=mozambique&pqs_section= (accessed 04.06.2014).
 John Borrie, Unacceptable Harm, Geneva: Unidir, 2009, p. 317.
 See United Nations disarmament fellowship, training and advisory services programme Report of the Secretary General, A/67/160, 19 July 2012.
 See Mexican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “The Foreign Ministry Inagurates the First Summer Program on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament”, http://www.sre.gob.mx/en/index.php/archived-press-releases/2608-the-foreign-ministry-inaugurates-the-first-summer-school-on-disarmament-and-nuclear-proliferation (accessed 30 September 2014).